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On Game Theoretic Peer Selection for Resilient
Peer-to-Peer Media Streaming
Mark Kai Ho Yeung, Student Member, IEEE, and Yu-Kwong Kwok, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Peer-to-peer (P2P) media streaming quickly emerges as an important application over the Internet. A plethora of
approaches have been suggested and implemented to support P2P media streaming. In our study, we first classified existing
approaches and studied their characteristics by looking at three important quantities: number of upstream peers (parents), number of
downstream peers (children), and average number of links per peer. In existing approaches, peers are assigned with a fixed number of
parents without regard to their contributions, measured by the amount of outgoing bandwidths. Obviously, this is an undesirable
arrangement as it leads to highly inefficient use of the P2P links. This observation motivates us to model the peer selection process as
a cooperative game among peers. This results in a novel peer selection protocol such that the number of upstream peers of a peer is
related to its outgoing bandwidth. Specifically, peers with larger outgoing bandwidth are given more parents, which make them less
vulnerable to peer dynamics. Simulation results show that the proposed protocol improves delivery ratio using similar number of links
per peer, comparing with existing approaches under a wide range of system parameters.
Index Terms—P2P media streaming, coalition, incentives, cooperative game, structured P2P topology, unstructured P2P topology,
peer selection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
ASthe Internet has become a core part of our daily lives,people rely more and more on it for information
retrieval and exchange. One recent profound trend is media
distribution over the Internet. Of particular importance is
peer-to-peer (P2P) streaming of media data due to the open
architecture of the Internet [1], [2], [3], [14], [22]. In a typical
P2P media streaming scenario, a media server could
support tens of thousands of concurrent users [19], [30],
[31]. Such a high scalability is achieved by having the server
stream media data to a subset of the whole client
population, which in turn shares the media data with other
clients in a P2P manner [11], [12], [13], [15], [16], [19], [20],
[21], [25], [30], [31].
Existing P2P media streaming approaches can be broadly
classified into two categories: structured and unstructured.
For the structured category, the direction of flow of packets
containing media information is fixed after a particular peer
joins the media distribution overlay network. On the other
hand, peers can exchange media packets with their
neighbors in both directions for the unstructured category
[27]. We can further divide the unstructured category into
pure and hybrid approaches. In this study, we report our
results on the structured case. The reader is referred to [27]
for our results on the unstructured case. In structured
approaches, peers can be organized in three different logical
structures: a single tree, multiple trees, and a directed
acyclic graph (DAG). We can analyze the characteristics of
existing approaches by looking at three important quan-
tities, namely, number of upstream peers, number of
downstream peers, and average number of links per peers.
Unfortunately, existing P2P media streaming approaches
do not fully exploit peer heterogeneity in the design of the
P2P network formation protocols. Specifically, the number
of upstream peers (parents) assigned to a particular peer is
usually fixed without regard to its outgoing bandwidth.
Obviously, this rigid arrangement is undesirable as it can
potentially lead to inefficient P2P links.
Our major contribution in this paper is that we model the
peer selection process as a cooperative game, called the peer
selection game, in which peers are free to form coalitions for
media streaming. We devise a set of specific conditions for
stable coalitions. Based on our novel game theoretic
analysis, we propose a novel peer selection protocol, where
each peer judiciously selects an appropriate number of
parents depending on its outgoing bandwidth. In particu-
lar, the proposed protocol is robust in that it autonomously
assigns more parents to peers with larger outgoing
bandwidth, making them less susceptible to peer dynamics,
i.e., joining and leaving events (formally defined in
Section 2). This is because they would accept more down-
stream peers (children) and, thus, are more important
entities. On the other hand, peers having smaller outgoing
bandwidth are given fewer children to make the average
number of links per peer comparable to existing ap-
proaches. This arrangement also provides participating
peers with incentives to contribute more resources because
increasing the amount of outgoing bandwidth implies a
lower likelihood for them to be affected by peer dynamics.
Simulation results show that the proposed game theoretic
peer selection protocol improves delivery ratio using
comparable number of links per peer, comparing with
existing approaches in many diverse scenarios.
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2 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING P2P MEDIA STREAMING
APPROACHES
We consider a media streaming application with a large
audience. It is assumed that the content provider, or the
media server, has insufficient resources to serve all the
requests simultaneously. The use of P2P technologies to
deliver media content is a low-cost and scalable method to
satisfy the overwhelming demands. In a P2P media
streaming system, there are three major entities: media
content, server nodes (server), and peer nodes (peer). Their
functions are as follows:
. The media content is the target audio and video
resources to be disseminated. It is encoded in the
constant bit rate (CBR) format at the rate of rKbps. The
server divides themedia into a streamof equally sized
packets and delivers them to the peers. Each packet
contains somemedia information, e.g., amedia frame.
We assume that the quality perceived by a peer is
determined by the number of received packets.
. Aserver node, or simply server, is the content provider
that owns the media content. It can be a dedicated
workstation or a content distribution network. How-
ever, the aggregate outgoing bandwidth of servers
cannot satisfy all streaming requests. Each server is
responsible for distributing media packets to a subset
of peer nodes.We assume that the core network is not
the performance bottleneck.
. A peer node, or simply peer, consumes the media
content. We assume that the incoming bandwidth of
all peers is larger than the media rate, i.e., r. On the
otherhand, eachpeer can freelydetermine theamount
of outgoing bandwidth to contribute. Specifically, we
denote the amount of outgoing bandwidth contrib-
uted by peer x as bx.
There have been many different approaches suggested to
organize peers for P2Pmedia streaming. We broadly classify
them into twomain categories: structured and unstructured.
Within the structured category, each peer is assigned with
dedicated upstream peers (parents) and dedicated down-
stream peers (children).We can further divide the structured
category into three approaches: single tree,multiple trees and
DAG. On the other hand, there is no such restriction for the
unstructured category. Peers can exchange media packets
with their neighbors in both directions. We discuss the
characteristics of existingP2Pmedia streamingapproaches in
the following.
In the single tree approach [7], [8], [11], [19], [20], [21],
peers are organized in a logical tree structure rooted at the
server, as shown in Fig. 1a. Each peer is assigned with one
upstream peer as its parent. Each peer depends on the sole
parent for all media packets originated from the server. Peer
is also obliged to accept some downstream peers as their
children. The number of downstream peers is determined
by the peer’s outgoing bandwidth. Since each child requires
r Kbps from its parent, the number of possible downstream
peers accepted by peer x is bbxr c. We denote the single tree
approach as Tree(1) and summarize its characteristics
mathematically by the following equations:
Number of upstream peers in Treeð1Þ ¼ 1; ð1Þ
Number of downstream peers in Treeð1Þ ¼ bx
r
 
; ð2Þ
Number of links per peer in Treeð1Þ ¼ Oð1Þ: ð3Þ
As each peer relies on its sole parent for all media
packets, the single tree approach is vulnerable to peer
dynamics, which is formally defined as the turn-over rate
per unit time of the participants. Furthermore, the outgoing
bandwidth of peers may not be fully utilized because each
increment costs r Kbps.
Similarly, themultiple trees approach [5], [12] is also based
on the tree structure. However, peers are organized in more
than one tree to be more resilient to peer dynamics.
Specifically, the server uses multiple descriptive coding
(MDC) [9], [18], which allows media packets to be delivered
in k independent streams. These different packet streams are
consideredasdifferent “descriptions” of the original video.A
receiver can always recover the original video with certain
distortions as governed by the total number of packets
received. This is a salient feature because the recovered video
quality is independent of specific packets but rather just
depends on the amount of information received. This is in
stark contrast with previous approaches such as scalable
layered coding.
Now, according to MDC, our model is such that each of
the k streams is handled by a separate tree rooted at the
server. Peers can obtain the complete media content by
joining the k trees. As such, this increases the number of
upstream peers to k, while the number of possible down-
stream peers becomes b bxr=kc. We denote the multiple trees
approach as TreeðkÞ and summarize its characteristics
mathematically by the following equations:
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Fig. 1. Logical topology. (a) Tree. (b) DAG. (c) Unstructured.
Number of upstream peers in TreeðkÞ ¼ k; ð4Þ
Number of downstream peers in TreeðkÞ ¼ bx
r=k
 
; ð5Þ
Number of links per peer in TreeðkÞ ¼ OðkÞ: ð6Þ
The multiple trees approach is less susceptible to peer
dynamics because each peer can obtain media packets from
k different parents. It also improves the utilization of peer
outgoing bandwidth because each increment is reduced to
r
kKbps. The major drawback is the increased overheads
because peers have tomaintain k independent trees. Another
potential drawback is that the actual media rate may be
slightly increased due to the less efficient coding scheme.
More recently, the DAG approach [13], [16] has been
proposed to achieve resilience without the need to maintain
more than one structure. Instead of trees, peers are
organized in a DAG, as shown in Fig. 1b. This allows peers
to control the number of parents and children for media
streaming. For example, each peer is assigned with i parents
and j children. We denote the DAG approach as DAGði; jÞ
and summarize its characteristics mathematically by the
following equations:
Number of upstream peers in DAGði; jÞ ¼ i; ð7Þ
Number of downstream peers in DAGði; jÞ ¼ j; ð8Þ
Number of links per peer in DAGði; jÞ ¼ OðiÞ: ð9Þ
As can be seen, the DAG approach is a generalization
of the multiple trees approach. Peers are allowed to have
i parents, which improves resilience to peer dynamics. On
the other hand, the server does not need to split media
packets but delivers them in one single stream. This avoids
the increased overheads in maintaining multiple structures.
The major challenge is to ensure that there is no loop among
peers. To avoid loops, it has been proposed that peers when
accepting a new peer should make sure that the new peer is
not in its upstream. This checking process inevitably
increases the overhead in maintaining the P2P structure.
The above structured approaches organize peers differ-
ently for media streaming. Each peer receives media packets
from some upstream peers and forward media packets to
some other downstream peers. In other words, the flow of
media packets is fixed when a new peer joins the P2P media
streaming network. On the other hand, in the unstructured
category [27], peers can exchange media packets with the
same set of peers, called neighbors. Specifically, in an
unstructuredmodel, peers are organized in a random graph,
as shown in Fig. 1c. Here, each peer is assigned with
nneighbors, and the availability ofmedia packets determines
the direction of media packets. We denote the pure
unstructured approach as UnstructðnÞ and summarize its
characteristics mathematically by the following equations:
Number of upstream peers in UnstructðnÞ ¼ n; ð10Þ
Number of downstream peers in UnstructðnÞ ¼ n; ð11Þ
Number of links per peer in UnstructðnÞ ¼ OðnÞ: ð12Þ
Each peer is connected to its neighbors and does not
require to maintain any specific networkwide structure.
This improves the scalability of P2P media streaming.
However, the number of neighbors, n, should be carefully
chosen to ensure the resultant random graph is connected.
It has been shown in [26] that n should be at least
0:5139 logðjN jÞ, where jN j represents the total number of
peers, for connectedness with high probability. For exam-
ple, we should set n ¼ 5 when there are 5,000 peers.
However, the unstructured approach can potentially lead to
a larger delay because media packets are randomly
traversed among peers. Furthermore, the unstructured
approach requires each peer to have a larger buffer to cater
for the randomness in peer connectivity. In practice, this is
usually not a significant concern because storage size is
often not a limiting factor and most P2P media streaming
applications focus on streaming stored media content. On
the other hand, the hybrid unstructured approach combines
the use of a structured approach with the unstructured
approach [23], [24].
From the above discussion, we can see that existing
approaches restrict the number of upstream peers using
various system parameters. The restriction is to limit the
average number of links maintained by each peer, which is
a measure of communication overheads involved in P2P
media streaming. However, we find that such restriction is
indeed unnecessary and does not take the peer hetero-
geneity into consideration. Since peers are allowed to
determine the amount of outgoing bandwidth to contribute,
it would be more desirable to judiciously allocate upstream
and downstream peers with respect to a peer’s contribution.
For example, peers with larger outgoing bandwidth are
expected to have more downstream peers. We should
provide these more capable peers with more upstream
peers so that they are more resilient to peer dynamics. On
the other hand, peers with smaller outgoing bandwidth can
be assigned with fewer upstream peers to reduce their
overheads. This arrangement serves as an incentive
measure for peers to contribute. Based on the structured
DAG approach, we model the peer selection process as a
cooperative game, which strives to handle heterogeneous
peers and achieve the above characteristics.
3 PROPOSED GAME THEORETIC PEER SELECTION
APPROACH
In P2P media streaming, each peer can choose its upstream
peers (parents) and downstream peers (children). We
consider peers as rational entities and model the peer
selection process as a strategic game.
We first focus on the case where there is only one
parent, p, and a set of children, c1; c2; . . . ; cn. We would
like to study how p should select its children such that the
resultant parent-child relationships are stable and resilient
to peer dynamics. Specifically, we formulate a cooperative
game where the players are the parent and its children.
The objective is to form a stable coalition which creates the
highest aggregate value. Here, stability is defined as the
probability that a participant departs from the coalition
and acts alone. The aggregate value is to be distributed
among the members. In other words, we have to tackle
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two inter-related issues: 1) formation of a stable coalition;
and 2) distribution of the aggregate value. We define the
elements of cooperative game and what constitutes a
stable coalition as follows:
A cooperative game consists of a finite set of players, N ,
and a scalar-valued function, V ðÞ, which associates every
subset G of N a real number, V ðGÞ [17]. For each coalition,
G, the number V ðGÞ represents the total payoff to be
divided among the members of G, i.e.,
V ðGÞ ¼
X
8x2G
vðxÞ; ð13Þ
where vðxÞ represents the value allocated to player x.
Here, V ðGÞ is called the value of the coalition, G. Players
can form other coalitions to obtain different values. We say
that a stable coalition is formed when players have no
incentive to deviate from joining the coalition. Specifically, a
coalition, G, is stable if we cannot find a better coalition, G0,
G0  G, with respect to V ðÞ. This implies thatX
x2G
vðxÞ  V ðG0Þ 8G0  G: ð14Þ
In other words, if a coalition is unstable, it is possible for
a subset of players to deviate such that each deviating
player can obtain a larger value than they do staying put. In
game theory literature, the above definition of stability is
called the core of the cooperative game [17]. In our context, it
is undesirable for peers to deviate after joining as that
would disrupt the structure of the P2P network and, in turn,
adversely affect the streaming quality.
With the above definitions, we devise a cooperative
game, called the peer selection game, to model the peer
selection process. The players are a parent p and a set of
children, c1; c2; . . . ; cn. We denote the set of all players as,
Ga, i.e.,
Ga ¼ fp; c1; c2; . . . ; cng: ð15Þ
The players can freely form other coalitions, G, among
themselves, where G  Ga. In general, different coalitions
lead to different values. The function V ðGÞ should satisfy
the following conditions:
V ðGÞ ¼ 0 if p 62 G; ð16Þ
V ðGÞ  V ðG0Þ if G  G0; ð17Þ
V ðG1 [ ciÞ  V ðG1Þ 6¼ V ðG2 [ ciÞ  V ðG2Þ: ð18Þ
Condition (16) dictates that the parent, p, is a necessary
member in any coalitions that generate nonzero values. In
other words, p is the veto player of the game. This is a
reflection of the reality, where downstream peers depend
on their parent for media packets. Without the participation
of p, a coalition does not bring any value to the members.
Condition (17) indicates that when comparing two
coalitions, G and G0, the coalition with more members
always generates a value no smaller than the other does.
This property precisely models a practical scenario, where a
parent having a larger number of children is more
important because if such a parent departs, a large number
of other peers will be disconnected. Thus, the system should
attach a higher value to such a coalition.
Condition (18) means that, in general, the same peer, ci,
brings different marginal utilities to different coalitions. The
discrepancy is attributed to the heterogeneous nature of P2P
media streaming. For instance, the presence of ci would be
more significant if the coalition contains only a few
children. On the other hand, ci does not create much value
if it joins another coalition already having many children.
We require the value function V ðGÞ to satisfy all the
three conditions discussed above. However, the precise
definitions depend on the specific characteristics of the
application. We will describe a novel value function in
Section 3.1.
In the peer selection game, the formation of a coalition G,
would create an aggregate value, represented by
V ðGÞ ¼P8x2G vðxÞ, where vðxÞ represents the utility allo-
cated to player x. We assume that each player would like to
maximize its share of utility, i.e., player x is interested in
maximizing vðxÞ. This is reasonable because each peer x is
more concerned with its own performance in terms of vðxÞ.
On the other hand, V ðGÞ is a measure of the value of
coalition G in the P2P network.
We also take the participating cost of peers into
consideration. Specifically, player x incurs some cost to be
a member of a coalition. We denote the amount of player x’s
coalitional effort as eðxÞ. This can be interpreted as the
amount of outgoing bandwidth and other resources
consumed. We define the utility of player x as the difference
between the share of value obtained from the coalition vðxÞ
and the amount of effort contributed to the coalition eðxÞ.
That is, utility is defined as
uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ  eðxÞ: ð19Þ
Moreover, we assume that eðxÞ depends on the number
of peers in the coalition, i.e.,
eðxÞ ¼ jGj  1ð Þe x ¼ p
e x 2 G n fpg;

ð20Þ
where e is a non-negative constant.
It is clear that if player x does not join any coalition, its
utility is zero, i.e., uðxÞ ¼ 0 if x 62 G. This implies that a
rational player will only join a coalition providing non-
negative utility, uðxÞ  0 if x 2 G. This is called the incentive
compatibility constraint:
uðxÞ  0 if x 2 G: ð21Þ
We denote Ga as the set of players and analyze the peer
selection game as Ga increases.
Case 1. Ga ¼ fpg. This is the baseline case where the
parent is the sole player. There is only one possible
coalition, G1 ¼ fpg. The player obtains all the value created
by the coalition, which is given by
V ðG1Þ ¼ vðpÞ: ð22Þ
Since p has no downstream peer, its effort is zero, i.e.,
eðpÞ ¼ 0. The utility of p is uðpÞ ¼ vðpÞ.
Case 2. Ga ¼ fp; c1g. The set of players include the
parent and one potential child, i.e., P ¼ fp; c1g. If p accepts
ci as its child, they form a coalition, G2 ¼ fp; c1g. The
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value created by the coalition is to be distributed between
the two players, i.e.,
V ðG2Þ ¼ vðpÞ þ vðc1Þ: ð23Þ
The value V ðG2Þ needs to be distributed judiciously in
order to make G2 a stable coalition such that neither p nor c1
has no incentive to leave. This requires the following
conditions to be satisfied:
vðpÞ  e  V ðG1Þ; ð24Þ
vðc1Þ  e  0: ð25Þ
Condition (24) suggests that p should receive a utility
larger than the value created by acting alone. Condition (25)
requires that the share of value allocated to c1 should be at
least the amount of its contributed effort.
In other words, the share of value allocated c1, denoted
by vðc1Þ, should be
e  vðc1Þ  V ðG2Þ  V ðG1Þe: ð26Þ
Case 3. Ga ¼ fp; c1; c2g. The set of players now includes p
and two potential children, i.e., P ¼ fp; c1; c2g. If the parent
accepts both peers, they form a larger coalition, G3 and
create a value of V ðG3Þ. This is to be distributed among the
three players:
V ðG3Þ ¼ vðpÞ þ vðc1Þ þ vðc2Þ: ð27Þ
We should ensure that G3 is a stable coalition, where the
parent and the two children have no incentive to leave. This
requires the following conditions to be satisfied:
vðpÞ  2e  V ðG1Þ; ð28Þ
vðc1Þ  e  0; ð29Þ
vðc2Þ  e  0; ð30Þ
vðpÞ þ vðc1Þ  V fp; c1gð Þ; ð31Þ
vðpÞ þ vðc2Þ  V fp; c2gð Þ: ð32Þ
Condition (28) ensures that the parent would not drop
the two children. Conditions (29) and (30) lead to non-
negative utilities for c1 and c2, respectively. In other words,
these two conditions are the incentive compatibility con-
straint in (21). The last two conditions, on the other hand,
cause dropping one of the two children an undesirable
move. We can simplify the conditions as follows:
vðc1Þ  V ðG3Þ  V fp; c2gð Þ; ð33Þ
vðc2Þ  V ðG3Þ  V fp; c1gð Þ; ð34Þ
vðc1Þ þ vðc2Þ  V ðG3Þ  V ðG1Þ  2e; ð35Þ
vðc1Þ; vðc2Þ  e: ð36Þ
Case n. Ga ¼ fp; c1; . . . ; cn1g. This is the general scenario
where the parent is encountered with ðn 1Þ potential
children. If they form a single coalition of size n, this creates
a value of V ðGnÞ, which is to be distributed among the
members, i.e.,
V ðGnÞ ¼ vðpÞ þ
X
ci2Gn
vðciÞ: ð37Þ
For Gn to be stable, peers should have no incentive to
leave the coalition individually or as a group. Similar to
previous cases, we obtain the following conditions:
vðcrÞ  V ðGnÞ  V Gn n fcrgð Þ 8cr; ð38Þ
X
8ci2P
vðciÞ  V ðGnÞ  V ðG1Þ  ðn 1Þe; ð39Þ
vðcrÞ  e 8cr: ð40Þ
The term “V ðGnÞ  V ðGn n fcrgÞ” is called the marginal
utility of cr. It is the additional amount of value created by
cr to the original coalition. Since p’s effort is increased by e if
cr is accepted as its child, the share of value allocated to cr is
vðcrÞ ¼ V ðGnÞ  V Gn n fcrgð Þe: ð41Þ
3.1 A Specific Value Function
We propose the following specific value function for our
peer selection game:
V ðGÞ ¼ log 1þ
P
8i6¼p
1
bi
 !
p 2 G;
0 otherwise:
8><
>: ð42Þ
Without loss of generality, the value function is zero
when the parent is the sole coalition member, i.e.,
V ðG1Þ ¼ 0. This is an increasing function in coalition size.
In other words, a new peer always brings additional value
to an existing coalition. Furthermore, a peer may create
different values to different coalitions. Therefore, the value
function satisfies Conditions (16), (17), and (18).
Besides the above characteristics, the value function can
also differentiate peers according to their outgoing band-
width values. For the same coalition, G, peer x would
receive a larger share of the value than peer y if bx < by. The
reason for that arrangement would become evident when
we discuss the proposed peer selection protocol in Section 4.
We illustrate the details with the following numerical
example.
Consider two coalitions: GX and GY , where GX ¼
fpx; c1; c2g and GY ¼ fpy; c3; c4; c5g. A peer c6 would like to
join one of the two coalitions. We take e ¼ 0:01 and the
outgoing bandwidth of the peers are listed as follows:
It is easy to see that V ðGXÞ ¼ 0:92 and V ðGY Þ ¼ 0:85. If c6
joins the coalition GX, we have V ðG0XÞ ¼ 1:10 and its share
of value is: V ðG0XÞ  V ðGXÞ  e ¼ 0:17. On the other hand,
c6 joining coalition GY would result in V ðG0Y Þ ¼ 1:04, and its
share of value is V ðG0Y Þ  V ðGY Þ  e ¼ 0:18. Therefore, c6
joins GY and vðc6Þ ¼ 0:18. The peer’s share of value, i.e.,
vðxÞ, in the coalition is then used by the parent in
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determining the amount of bandwidth allocation, which
will be discussed in Section 4.
4 PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The proposed peer selection game addresses how a peer
selects the best parent with respect to its share of value
obtained. Furthermore, the coalition formed is stable in that
each and everymember has no incentive to leave unilaterally
or as a group. Specifically, our proposed schemes are fully
distributed so that the participating peers are completely
autonomous in deciding, which children to be admitted or
which parents to join. Second, our proposed schemes are of
low complexity because participating peers do not need to
keep heavy weighted state information and carry out
extensive message exchanges. Third, our proposed schemes
are robust to peer dynamics in that even if a certain peer,
possibly acting as a parent, involuntarily departs the system
(e.g., due to unexpected machine failures), its associated
children can get new connections with other parents. This is
demonstrated by our simulation results below.
As discussed in Section 2, we should allow peers to have
multiple upstream peers to improve resilience against peer
dynamics. Unlike existing approaches,weproposed to let the
number of upstream peers depend on the peer’s outgoing
bandwidth. Specifically, peerx joins theP2Pmedia streaming
network by obtaining a list of m candidate parents from the
server.Here,weassume that similar to the caseof aBitTorrent
system [4], such a list can be obtained from a number of
“trackers,” which can be reached by a well-known address.
Then, peer x contacts these candidate parents. Each parent y
replies with a bandwidth allocation, bðx; yÞ, which is made
proportional to peer x’s share of value, i.e.,
bðx; yÞ ¼  vðcxÞ; ð43Þ
where  is a performance parameter, called the allocation
factor.
It should be noted that bðx; yÞ is normalizedwith respect r.
If peer x cannot obtain the necessary bandwidth from the best
candidate, peer y, alone, i.e., bðx; yÞ < 1, peer x accepts the
second best candidate as its upstream peer. This process
continues until the aggregate bandwidth allocated by up-
stream peers can support the media rate. We detail the peer
selection protocols for parent peers and child peers in
Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. The following numerical
example illustrates the proposed peer selection process.
Algorithm 1. The proposed peer selection protocol (parent).
: allocation factor;
Parent py
Upon receiving a request from a potential, cx, do:
Calculate: vðcxÞ ¼ V ðGY [ cxÞ  V ðGY Þ  e;
if vðcxÞ  e then
reply with the bandwidth allocation, bx;y ¼  vðcxÞ;
else
reply with the bandwidth allocation, bx;y ¼ 0;
end if
Algorithm 2. The proposed peer selection protocol (child).
m: number of candidate parents (obtained from server);
Child cx
Send requests to the m candidate parents;
Each candidate parent y replies with its allocation, bx;y;
Denote: B0 ¼ fbx;yg, 8y;
B ¼ f;g;
b ¼ 0;
while b < 1 do
Select the largest allocation, bx;y0 , from B;
B ¼ B [ y0;
b ¼ bþ bx;y0 ;
end while
Cancel the allocation for those parent(s) not listed in B;
Confirm the allocation for those parent(s) listed in B;
We take  ¼ 1:5 andm ¼ 5. In other words, a joining peer
is given five candidate parents. For simplicity, we assume
these five candidates have no downstream peer such that
they have the same bandwidth allocation to a particular
peer. Consider three joining peers: c1, c2, and c5. Since b1 ¼ 1,
we have vðc1Þ ¼ 0:68, and its allocated bandwidth is
 vðc1Þ ¼ 1:02 > 1. Thus, c1 has one upstream peer. For c2,
its outgoing bandwidth is b2 ¼ 2 and vðc2Þ ¼ 0:40. Each
candidate parent allocates  vðc2Þ ¼ 0:59. This implies
that c2 should select two candidates as its upstream peers.
Finally, c5’s outgoingbandwidth is b5 ¼ 3, and vðc5Þ is 0.28.As
such, c5 accepts three upstream peers.
From the above illustration, we can see that the number
of upstream peers accepted by a particular peer depends on
the peer’s outgoing bandwidth, and the allocation factor, .
The value function, defined in (42), implies that a peer with
a larger contribution would be provided with more up-
stream peers, and vice versa. This causes the share of value
decrease with increasing outgoing bandwidth. This is
because we would like to provide more parents to peers
with larger outgoing bandwidth. With more parents, they
are less likely to be affected by peer dynamics. On the other
hand, peers having smaller outgoing bandwidth accept
fewer parents, which reduce the average number of links
per peer. Although they are more vulnerable to peer
dynamics, we expect this effect is limited as they have only
a few children. Simulation results in Section 5 suggest that
we can improve delivery ratio with comparable average
number of links per peer. We note that the proposed peer
selection process also serves as an incentive to contribute.
Indeed, a peer with a larger outgoing bandwidth would
in fact get a larger number of parents (i.e., upstream peers),
with each of which providing a smaller “share” of coalition
value, i.e., a small value of incoming bandwidth. This
arrangement is to enhance the resilience and robustness of
such high-contribution peer in that even if one of its parent
departs the system, it will still have plenty of other parents
to supply data to it. On the other hand, for a peer with a
smaller outgoing bandwidth, it will get a larger “share” of
the coalition value from each parent, but then, it will have
much fewer parents associated with it. Thus, such a peer
will not be as resilient to peer dynamics as compared to
those high-contribution peers.
We denote our proposed peer selection protocol as,
GameðÞ. Table 1 compares the proposed protocol with other
existing approaches. We can see that existing approaches
assign upstream peers without regard to a peer’s outgoing
bandwidth. On the other hand, the proposed protocol allows
the number of upstream peers to be dependent on the peer’s
outgoing bandwidth. Furthermore, peers have no incentive
to relocate themselves for better performance. This leads to a
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more efficient allocation of P2P link and, hence, a smaller
amount of communication overhead.
In our protocols, any peer can choose to be a parent.
Specifically, when the system starts, there will be an initial
set of participants where they connect to the server directly,
and yet, each of them acts as a “null” parent in the sense
that there is not any child connecting to it. Subsequently, a
new peer joining the system could also opt to connect to the
server directly under the condition that it cannot get a higher
vðxÞ value, compared to its V ðxÞ value as a “null” parent, if
it tries to associate with one of the existing peers.
Depending on the distribution of the incoming and out-
going bandwidth values of the participating peers, some
newly joined peers will eventually find it more beneficial in
associating with an existing peer as a child rather than to act
alone. As the system evolves, a hierarchy will be formed.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
game-theoretic peer selection protocol. We implemented
four existing approaches for performance comparison:
. Random. We have implemented a totally random
peer selection approach (similar in essence to the
probabilistic peer selection schemes used in con-
temporary P2P systems such as BitTorrent [4]) as a
baseline approach in our comparison.
. Tree(1). Peers are organized in a single tree. Each
peer has one parent, and the number of children
depends on the peer’s outgoing bandwidth, as
shown in Table 1.
. Tree(4). Peers are organized in 4 independent trees.
This allows each peer to have four parents, while the
number of children is also dependent on the peer’s
outgoing bandwidth, as shown in Table 1.
. DAG(3, 15). Peers are organized in a DAG. In
particular, we let each peer accept three parents
and 15 children, i.e., i ¼ 3, and j ¼ 15, as shown in
Table 1. The same settings were also used in [16].
. Unstruct(5). Peers are organized in an unstructured
overlay, i.e., a random graph. However, this is
different from the Random approach mentioned
above in that the system imposes an upper bound on
peer connectivity. Specifically, we set n ¼ 5 such that
each peer is assigned with five neighbors. Since there
are up to 3,000 peers among the simulation
scenarios, each peer should have at least 0:5139
logð3;000Þ neighbors for connectedness with high
probability, i.e., n ¼ 5.
. Game(1.5). Peers are organized in a generalized DAG
using the proposed peer selection protocol detailed in
Algorithms 1 and 2. The allocation factor,, is taken to
be 1.5 and the cost constant, e, is taken to be 0.01. We
will investigate the effect of  in Section 5.4.
The performance of P2P media streaming is quantified
with five performance metrics:
1. delivery ratio, the ratio between the number of
received packets to that of generated packets,
2. number of joins, the number of joining peers, which
includes new peers and those existing peers who are
forced to rejoin due to peer dynamics,
3. number of new links, the number of links created due
to peer dynamics,
4. average packet delay, and
5. average number of links per peer.
We use the GT-ITM [10] network topology generator to
generate physical topology based on the transit-stub scheme.
The network consists of one transit domain with 50 nodes.
The mean link delay is set to 30 ms, which represents the
backbone network. Each node in the transit domain is
connected to five stub domains, each of which has 20 nodes.
The mean link delay is set to 3 ms, representing the edge
network. As such, there are 5,000 edge nodes in total. We
randomly select some edge nodes to act as peers. Unless
otherwise specified, the outgoing bandwidth of peers is
randomly chosen between 500 Kbps and 1,500 Kbps. Table 2
lists the values of other simulation parameters.
5.1 Effect of Turnover Rate
We varied the turnover rate between 0 percent and
50 percent, and the results are shown in Fig. 2. The turnover
rate is defined as the percentage of peers leave-and-rejoin
throughout the media streaming session. For example, if the
turnover rate is at 20 percent, there are 200 leave-and-join
operations. This measures how the performance of the
media streaming network in the presence of peer dynamics.
Figs. 2a and 2b shows the delivery ratio of peers when
the turnover rate is 0-25 percent and 25-50 percent,
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TABLE 1
Comparison of Different P2P Media Streaming Approaches
TABLE 2
Simulation Parameters
respectively. It is evident that the single tree approach,
Tree(1), results in the worst delivery ratio. As we discussed
in Section 2, each peer depends on its sole parent for media
packets. If that parent leaves the session, the peer cannot
receive any media packets until a new parent is found. This
inevitably lowers the delivery ratio. On the other hand, the
two structured approaches (Tree(4) and DAG(3,15)) gives
comparable performance throughout the whole simulation
range. This may be attributed to the fact that the DAG
approach is a generalization of multiple trees, only without
the need to maintain more than one structure. The proposed
approach, which is based on the peer selection game
described in Section 3, shows some improvements over
other structured approaches. Furthermore, Game(1.5) is in
par with Unstruct(5) at low turnover rates, i.e., between
0 percent and 25 percent. This indicates that the proposed
peer selection protocol is effective in mitigating the
performance degradation due to peer dynamics. Since the
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Fig. 2. Effect of turnover rate (random join and leave). (a) Delivery ratio. (b) Delivery ratio. (c) Number of joins. (d) Average packet delay. (e) Number
of new links. (f) Average number of links per peer.
unstructured approach organizes peers in a random graph,
the inherent random arrangement of peers means that the
performance is least affected by peer dynamics.
We turn our attention to the number of joins throughout
the session. Notice that all approaches, except Tree(1), give
almost identical results at low turnover rates. We only show
the number of joins at turnover rates between 25 percent
and 50 percent, as shown in Fig. 2c. We observe that Tree(1)
generates the largest number of join operations among all
the approaches, which is the major reason for its worst
delivery ratio. This also follows that Unstruct(5) results in
the smallest number of joins. As peers are interconnected to
form a random graph for media streaming, a peer is forced
to rejoin only when all of its neighbors fail, which is
unlikely to occur for n ¼ 5. Of the structured approaches,
the proposed protocol results in the largest number of joins.
This is because the peer selection process gives more
parents to peers having higher outgoing bandwidth, which
causes the other peers more susceptible to peer dynamics.
Therefore, there is slightly a larger number of joins.
We measured the average delay of received media
packets and the result is shown in Fig. 2d. Tree(1) builds a
single tree, which is the most efficient and achieves the least
average packet delay. On the other extreme, Unstruct(5)
builds a random graph, which significantly increases the
average packet delay because of random arrangement. The
proposed peer selection protocol manages to achieve
comparable performance with the other two structured
approaches. Unlike Tree(1), media packets can achieve at
peers from different paths for Tree(4), DAG(3,15), and
Game(1.5). As such, peers experience longer average packet
delay. Actually, the average packet delay generally in-
creases with the number of possible paths.
Fig. 2d shows the number of new links when the
turnover rate ranges from 0 percent to 50 percent. For all
approaches, the number of new links increases almost
linearly with turnover rate. This is because the number of
new links created is closely related to turnover. As the
turnover rate increases, there are more peers joining the P2P
overlay, which creates more new links to existing peers.
Besides that, existing peers establish new links to compen-
sate for those lost as a result of peer dynamics. Therefore,
we have the almost linear trend. However, their rates of
increase differ a lot, with Tree(1) having the lowest rate and
Unstruct(5) having the largest rate. The ordering can be
explained by the average number of links per peer, see
Fig. 2f. Of the existing approaches, their simulation results
match closely with the values in Table 1. For Game(1.5), the
average number of links per peer is 3.47, which slightly
larger than DAG(3,15) but smaller than Tree(4). The number
of links per peer can be considered as a measure of
overheads incurred in P2P media streaming. The proposed
peer selection protocol strategically establishes P2P links
such that peers are assigned with a number of parents
depending on their outgoing bandwidth. On the average,
peers in the proposed approach have comparable number
of links with those in existing structured approaches.
We have assumed that the join-and-leave peers are
randomly chosen from the entire population. However, it is
reasonable to expect that peers with low contribution are
more likely to leave the session. They may be considered as
users choosing from different available channels before
settling at a particular one. Fig. 3 shows the delivery ratio
when the join-and-leave peers are selected among peers
with the smallest outgoing bandwidth. Since the four
existing approaches do not take peer contribution into
consideration, their performance remains the same. Never-
theless, we also plotted their results for comparison. On the
other hand, the proposed approach shows consistent
improvement across the entire range of turnover rates. This
indicates that the proposed peer selection game provides
more parents to peers with higher outgoing bandwidth,
leading to the overall improvement in delivery ratio. At
increasing turnover rates, the performance of Game(1.5)
gradually decreases and approaches that of UnstructðnÞ.
This confirms that peers contributing larger outgoing
bandwidth are more important to the overall performance.
To summarize, the proposed peer selection protocol
achieves better delivery ratio than existing structured
approaches using comparable number of links per peer.
At low turnover rates, the performance is in par with the
unstructured approach. It shows more improvement if peer
dynamics is focused on peers with low contribution. As for
average packet delay, the proposed approach is also similar
to other structured counterparts. This suggests that the
proposed peer selection game is effective in forming stable
coalitions resulting in overall performance improvement.
5.2 Effect of Outgoing Bandwidth of Peers
Fig. 4 shows the effect of outgoing bandwidth of peers. The
minimum outgoing bandwidth was kept at 500 Kbps, while
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Fig. 3. Effect of turnover rate (nonrandom join and leave). (a) Delivery ratio. (b) Delivery ratio.
the maximum value ranges from 1,000 Kbps to 3,000 Kbps.
This studies the impact of different peer contributions on
various approaches.
Since existing approaches (Tree(1), Tree(4), DAG(3,15),
and Unstruct(5)) do not consider peer contribution in
constructing the structures, the change in peer outgoing
bandwidth has no effect on the average number of links per
peer, see Fig. 4a. For the proposed approach, increasing peer
outgoing bandwidth leads to the rise in the average number
of links per peer, even the allocation factor remains the same.
This suggests that the average overheads experienced by a
peer increasewith its contribution. This is due to thedesign of
the proposed peer selection game. The amount of bandwidth
allocation to peer x, vðxÞ, decreases with its outgoing
bandwidth, bx. Therefore, the larger the bx, the more is the
numberof its upstreampeers.As such,wehavewitnessed the
upward trend. We believe that this is a reasonable arrange-
ment because peers who can afford to contribute more are
expected to incur increased maintenance overheads.
The change in peer outgoing bandwidth also affects the
average packet delay, see Fig. 4b. Of all structured
approaches, average packet delay gradually decreases with
increasing outgoing bandwidth. With reference to Table 1,
the number of downstream peers for Tree(1) and Tree(4) are
directly related to outgoing bandwidth. If peers can accept
more children, the height of the tree structures would be
shorter, which reduces the average packet delay. Although
DAG(3,15) limits the number of downstream peers to 15,
most peers cannot accept so many children, i.e., the
constraint is not always active. When we increase the
outgoing bandwidth, some peers can still accommodate
more children. The effect is that the DAG structure can be
shortened, reducing the average packet delay. For the
proposed approach, we can observe from Algorithm 1 that
the amount of bandwidth allocation depends on the
parent’s outgoing bandwidth and the allocation factor, .
Therefore, the average packet delay of Game(1.5) also
shows a deceasing trend. The above discussions, however,
do not apply to UnstructðnÞ. Since the number of neighbors
are fixed at five, its average packet delay remains un-
changed throughout the entire range.
Fig. 4c shows the number of new links created as we
varied the maximum peer outgoing bandwidth between
1,000 Kbps and 3,000 Kbps. All existing approaches are not
affected because the number of links per peer also remains
unchanged. Similarly, the increasing trend in Game(1.5) is
primarily due to the increase in the average number of links
per peer. This explanation is confirmed by the number of
joins, which is not affected by peer outgoing bandwidth. For
brevity, we use a bar chart as shown in Fig. 4d. Although
Game(1.5) achieves similar number of joins with other
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Fig. 4. Effect of outgoing bandwidth of peers. (a) Average number of links per peer. (b) Average packet delay. (c) Number of new links. (d) Number
of joins.
approaches, it has increasing number of links per peer. This
leads to the rising trend in the number of new links.
To summarize, all structured P2P media streaming
approaches give decreasingly small average packet delay
when peers contribute more resources. However, the
proposed peer selection protocol shows a unique character-
istic: the average number of links per peer increases with
outgoing bandwidth. We believe that this arrangement is
justifiable because a peer contributing more resources is
more willing to maintain more links.
5.3 Effect of Peer Population Size
This set of simulation studies the effect of number of peer
population size on various performance metrics, see Fig. 5.
Specifically, we varied the number of peers between 500
and 3,000 and measured the number of joins, number of
new links, and average packet delay.
Although the turnover rate was kept at 20 percent, the
larger peer population size leads to the corresponding
increase in thenumberof join-and-leavepeers. This translates
to the rising trend in number of joins, as shown in Fig. 5a.
Except Tree(1), all approaches show indistinguishable
performance. As discussed previously, the exceptional large
number of joins in Tree(1) is due to its arrangement where
peers depend on their sole parent for all media packets. The
other approaches providemultiple paths for packet delivery.
However, the performance difference slightly increases at
large peer population size. Fig. 5b is the magnified view of
Fig. 5a for the range 2,000-3,000.We can see that the proposed
peer selectionprotocol givesmarginallymorenumberof joins
compared with other approaches. This is because of the
dynamic peer selection process. Peers with smaller outgoing
bandwidth are prone to be more affected by peer dynamics.
As such, it is more likely for them to be isolated, which
increases the number of joins.
Although the proposed approach requires slightly more
number of join operations, its number of new links is
comparable to other structured approaches, see Fig. 5c. This
is because the number of new links is affected by two factors:
number of joining peers and number of links affected by peer
dynamics. When a peer leaves the structure, the links to
downstream peers are broken. These affected peers are
required to establish new links for compensation. Therefore,
the proposed approach manages to limit the number of
affected peers through the peer selection process.
Fig. 5d shows the variations of average packet delay
when the peer population size is between 500 and 3,000. It is
intuitive to observe that the average packet delay increases
with the number of peers. This is because media packets are
required to traverse more overlay links in order to reach all
peers. Of the structured approaches, i.e., Tree(1), Tree(4),
DAG(3, 15), and Game(1.5), their rates of increase are
comparatively low. This suggests that structured ap-
proaches scale very well with respect to the number of
peers, which explains their overwhelming popularity. For
example, a binary tree can accommodate twice the number
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Fig. 5. Effect of peer population size. (a) Number of joins. (b) Number of joins. (c) Number of new links. (d) Average packet delay.
of peers by increasing its height by 1. On the other hand, the
unstructured approach, UnstructðnÞ, is more sensitive to
peer population size, especially at the low end. This is
because it sacrifices packet delay in favor of resilience. As
such, peers in an unstructured based P2P media streaming
network are expected to experience a longer startup time
and require a larger buffer.
To summarize, comparing with other existing ap-
proaches, the proposed peer selection protocol scales
equally well as the peer population size increases. Although
there are more joins at the same turnover rate, the proposed
approach is able to maintain the number of new links to a
reasonable level. This indicates that the proposed peer
selection game performs well against peer dynamics.
5.4 Effect of Allocation Factor, 
We have compared the proposed peer selection protocol
with other existing approaches under different settings. In
previous scenarios, the allocation factor, , is fixed at 1.5.
We would like to investigate the effect of  on the
performance of the proposed approach. Specifically, we
set  to 1.2 and 2.0, represented by Game(1.2) and
Game(2.0), respectively. The results are shown in Fig. 6.
With reference to Fig. 6a, we can see that increasing the
allocation factor, , would reduce the average number of
links per peer. This is because the larger the allocation
factor, the more is the bandwidth allocation to a down-
stream peer. As such, peers are not necessary to have so
many parents provided that other parameters are the same.
On the average, each peer has a fewer number of links. If
the allocation factor is sufficiently large, the proposed peer
selection protocol reduces to Tree(1), i.e., each peer has one
parent. Similarly, a large  allow peers to experience a
smaller average packet delay, as shown in Fig. 6d. The drop
in average packet delay is due to the reduction in number of
upstream peers. When media packets have more possible
paths to reach a peer, this usually involves a larger number
of links, resulting in the decreasing trend.
We kept the number of peers at 1,000 and increased the
turnover rate up to 50 percent. Figs. 6c and 6d shows the
effect of  on the number of joins and number of new links,
respectively. Since each peer has more number of parents
when  increases, this improves the overall resilience to
peer dynamics. As such, Game(1.2) gives the best results for
both metrics. In particular, the performance difference
gradually increases with the turnover rate. This indicates
that we should set a smaller allocation factor if it is expected
to have more join-and-leave activities, e.g., at the beginning
or at end of a streaming session.
To summarize, reducing the allocation factor, , would
produce more links per peer. This provides better resilience
against peer dynamics at the cost of larger average packet
delay. On the other hand, if  is sufficiently larger, the
proposed peer selection protocol reduces to the single tree
approach. By adjusting the allocation factor alone, we can
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Fig. 6. Effect of allocation factor, . (a) Average number of links per peer. (b) Average packet delay. (c) Number of joins. (d) Number of new links.
control how peers are organized to disseminate media
packets.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
P2P media streaming has attracted significant attention
because of its promising scalability and resilience charac-
teristics. There are various existing approaches [11], [12],
[13], [15], [16], [19], [20], [21], [25], [30], [31] to achieve P2P
media streaming on the global scale. We have classified
them in two broad categories: structured and unstructured.
For the structured category, the direction of media packets
is fixed after a particular peer joins the P2P media streaming
network. On the other hand, the unstructured category
allows peers to exchange media packets with their
neighbors in both directions. We further divided the
structured category into three approaches: single tree,
multiple trees, and DAG, based on how peers are
organized. For each existing approach, we analyzed three
important quantities: the number of upstream peers, the
number of downstream peers, and the average number of
links per peer, see Table 1. Unfortunately, we found that
existing approaches do not take peer heterogeneity into
consideration. We proposed a peer selection protocol,
where each peer judiciously selects an appropriate set of
parents depending on its outgoing bandwidth. Specifically,
we model the peer selection process as a cooperative game
such that peers form stable coalitions with highest values.
Simulation results have shown that, comparing with
existing approaches, the proposed protocol improves
delivery ratio in the presence of peer dynamics. One
promising avenue of further research is to extend our study
to model a wireless media data access scenario [28], [29].
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